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A Blueprint for States To Solve the Mandatory 




When she started working at Chipotle in 2010, Araceli 
Gutierrez had a dream to become a chef.1 She believed that her 
new job would bring her closer to realizing this dream.2 But not 
long after she started, she was working fifteen-hour days and 
only getting paid for eight.3 Although this seemed strange to her, 
Gutierrez soldiered on.4 She wanted to advance within the com-
pany and believed that speaking up would jeopardize this goal.5 
When she eventually became an assistant manager of the store, 
she tried to speak up about the issue, but those above her told 
her that working extra, unpaid hours was “part of the job” and 
that she could not sue.6  
Low-wage workers who were forced to work unpaid hours 
were, at this point, not without recourse. In 2013, a former em-
ployee sued Chipotle for lost wages.7 The complaint alleged vio-
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
Adam Hansen for helping me develop this topic. I would also like to thank David 
Hahn, Josh Greenberg, Hillary Hoffman, and Stanton McManus for their edito-
rial contributions. Finally, thanks to Alan Z. Rozenshtein for helpful comments 
on a draft of this Note. Copyright © 2020 by Sam Cleveland. 
 1. See Heather Long, Why I’m Suing Chipotle for “Wage Theft,” CNN BUS. 
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/01/news/economy/chipotle 
-lawsuit-wage-theft/index.html [https://perma.cc/UN48-XSC6]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. See id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1303 (D. 
Colo. 2014). 
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lations of the Fair Labor Standards Act wage and hour provi-
sions and requested compensation for wages withheld by 
Chipotle.8 While the lawsuit was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Epic Systems v. Lewis, a case testing the enforceability 
of employment contracts that require claims to be brought in 
one-on-one arbitration with the company, rather than collec-
tively in a class action or class arbitration.9 The Supreme Court 
ruled that those provisions were enforceable.10 Mere weeks after 
this decision, nearly three thousand members of the class action 
were dismissed from the suit.11 Sometime around 2014, Chipotle 
began inserting a clause in its employment contracts mandating 
all disputes that may arise between the employer and employee 
be resolved in one-on-one arbitration.12 Just like that, a signifi-
cant number of potential class members who had suffered lost 
wages were left effectively without legal recourse.  
The Chipotle case illustrates the mammoth effect that man-
datory arbitration agreements have in the employment context. 
Wage theft and other employment-related harms are big prob-
lems that make life materially worse for the most vulnerable.13 
Amongst the most effective ways of dealing with this widespread 
problem is collective action, through either a class-action lawsuit 
or class arbitration.14 Knowing this, and sensing the increasingly 
arbitration-friendly disposition of the courts,15 employers began 
 
 8. Complaint at 56–69, Turner, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (No. 1:14-cv-02612-
JLK). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 10. Id.  
 11. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Opt-in Plaintiffs 
Bound by Chipotle’s Arbitration Agreement, Turner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (No. 
1:14-cv-02612-JLK); see also Dave Jamieson, The Supreme Court’s Arbitration 
Ruling Is Already Screwing Thousands of Chipotle Workers, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 27, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-courts-ruling 
-this-week-is-already-screwing-thousands-of-chipotle-workers_us_5b0844aae 
4b0568a880b3e26?x6c [https://perma.cc/5XJV-YSQX]. 
 12. Sparky Abraham, This Burrito Includes an Arbitration Clause, CUR-
RENT AFF. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/08/this-burrito 
-includes-an-arbitration-clause/ [https://perma.cc/7KN9-GCAU]. 
 13. See infra Part I.D. 
 14. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to 
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconsciona-
ble Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85–88 (2004) (noting that individual 
claims may not be financially feasible, among other problems with them). 
 15. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1637 (2005). 
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inserting mandatory arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts.16 While being shunted into secret one-on-one arbitrations 
to resolve a dispute with an employer would offend many peo-
ples’ sense of justice,17 employers are now entitled to do just this. 
There are not many options to effectively remedy the prob-
lem posed by this situation. The already arbitration-friendly Su-
preme Court has become even more pro-arbitration and hostile 
to employee claims.18 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “exhibited 
singular determination in upholding t[his] federal policy on ar-
bitration.”19 While federal legislation would be a preferable solu-
tion,20 Congress has not shown an appetite for taking on arbitra-
tion in recent years.21 The ability of agencies to help remedy this 
problem is doubtful, as shown in Epic Systems, where an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute was found to be secondary to 
the force of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).22 
 
 16. Id. at 1638 (“Once the Supreme Court began to issue decisions stating 
that commercial arbitration was ‘favored’ and that arbitration of employment 
claims could be permitted, businesses jumped on the opportunity to compel ar-
bitration in contexts where they previously thought arbitration agreements 
would not be enforced.”).  
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See Russ Bleemer et al., Kavanaugh on Arbitration, CPR SPEAKS (July 
16, 2018), https://blog.cpradr.org/2018/07/16/kavanaugh-on-arbitration/ 
[https://perma.cc/JF8J-86RM] (explaining that Kavanaugh’s decisions show a 
pro-business, pro-arbitration leaning); Erin Mulvaney, Brett Kavanaugh “Looks 




 19. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION xix 
(2d ed. 2007). 
 20. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Eq-
uitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009) (explain-
ing why Congress changing the laws regarding arbitration is a more realistic 
outcome). 
 21. A house bill, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017), prohibiting pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements in an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dis-
pute did not make it out of committee. Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced 
similar legislation in the Senate, S. Res. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018), which also 
failed to make it out of committee. Similar legislation had been introduced be-
fore and was met with equal apathy. E.g., S. Res. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 
Res. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 22. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622–23 (2018) (citing 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (2018)). 
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Considering the degree to which federal remedies seem un-
likely, the answer to stemming mandatory arbitration in the em-
ployment context likely rests with the states.23 Individual states 
have attempted to counteract the preference towards arbitra-
tion, but these approaches have heretofore been unsuccessful.24 
This Note proposes a novel approach: for states to limit the ill-
effects of mandatory arbitration by crafting laws governing con-
tract formation.25 These laws would be grounded in bedrock con-
tract formation principles and would, if properly drafted, avoid 
the looming preemption issues with state laws concerning arbi-
tration.26 If written in a way that does not single out arbitration, 
such laws a could significantly curtail, if not eliminate, the neg-
ative effects of mandatory arbitration in employment con-
tracts.27 This Note provides a roadmap to state legislatures and 
state courts to effect this approach. 
Part I examines the history of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
specifically as it relates to mandatory arbitration in employment 
contracts. It also explains the reasons why these clauses are 
problematic and focuses on the effects they have on low-wage 
workers. Part II discusses efforts, heretofore unsuccessful, to 
stem the tide of mandatory arbitration. The Supreme Court has 
closed off many of the possible avenues of combating the injus-
tice posed by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts, but all hope is not yet lost. Part III proposes a solution 
that threads the needle through the thicket of the Supreme 
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence. In order to combat man-
datory arbitration clauses, state legislatures can look to basic 
contract principles in order to require a “back to the basics” ap-
proach to contract formation. Any state attempting this ap-
proach will need to be acutely aware of the potential pitfalls and 
traps inherent in this strategy, but should it be successful, states 
can significantly curtail negative effects associated with manda-
tory pre-dispute arbitration.28 Not only that, but such laws 
 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 
(2017) (upholding an arbitration clause despite the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
holding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
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would also have a secondary effect of stemming other inequitable 
terms in adhesive contracts.29 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
The FAA as originally enacted had a much narrower scope 
than the way it has been interpreted since.30 The current inter-
pretation has strayed far from Congress’s original intention.31 
Far from being inconsequential, this drift has proved to be harm-
ful to some of the most vulnerable segments of the population,32 
an effect which is exacerbated by other changes that have made 
for a hostile environment for workers.33 In order to illuminate 
the solution proposed by this Note, this Part gives background 
information on the history of the FAA, the Supreme Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence broadening the scope of the statute, the rise of the 
use of mandatory arbitration in contracts of adhesion, and the 
state of workers’ rights.  
A. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The use of arbitration has a long history.34 Arbitration was 
used in what is now the United States as early as 1650,35 but its 
use was almost always limited to disputes between businesses.36 
In the early days, powerful parties did not use arbitration as a 
way to deny parties with less bargaining power (such as employ-
ees, consumers, or franchisees) the ability to vindicate their 
claims.37  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a 
perceived “judicial hostility” to arbitration,38 although there is 
 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. See infra Part I.A. 
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
 32. See infra Part I.C. 
 33. See infra Part I.D. 
 34. See JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS 
TO LOCARNO 153–89 (discussing, among other topics, arbitration between Greek 
gods, the arbitration system in ancient Greece, Roman participation in the 
Greek form of arbitration, and arbitration in the Middle Ages).  
 35. Id. at 190. 
 36. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1636. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“As the 
Court has explained, the FAA was a response to hostility of American courts to 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, a judicial disposition inherited from 
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doubt about whether American courts were truly hostile to arbi-
tration or whether they simply felt “bound by a precedent they 
no longer agreed with but which they felt required legislative 
action to undo.”39 To abrogate the use of these doctrines, foster 
certainty,40 and abolish these “anachronism[s] of our American 
law,”41 which were employed despite “frequent protest” by 
courts,42 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 
1925.43 
Most of the support for passage of the FAA came from busi-
ness groups and commercial organizations which had already 
been effectively using arbitration.44 Business came to favor arbi-
tration for its efficiency, ease, preservation of business relation-
ships, and quickness.45 Much of the FAA’s legislative history 
shows that Congress only contemplated arbitration between 
 
then-longstanding English practice.”). This hostility was inherited from the 
English system of law, which relied on principles of “ouster” and “revocability,” 
which disfavored arbitration. See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act 
Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224 
(2013). 
 39. Stephen E. Friedman, Trusting Courts with Arbitration Provisions, 68 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 821, 846 (2018). Indeed, courts were expressing skepticism 
about the doctrines of revocability and ouster as early as fifty years prior to the 
enactment of the FAA. Id. at 847.  
 40. See David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class 
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW. 
55, 61 (2007) (“This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an 
opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty 
contracts—an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the document 
by the parties to it. It does not involve any new principle of law except to provide 
a simple method by which the parties may be brought before the court in order 
to give enforcement to that which they have already agreed to.” (citing 65 CONG. 
REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of the Chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee))). 
 41. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1225 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 
(1924)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1947)).  
 44. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and 
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 
(1924) (statement of Julius Cohen) (“[T]he statement I make is backed up by 73 
commercial organizations in the country who have, by a formal vote, approved 
of the bill before you gentlemen.”). 
 45. See id.  
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businesses.46 Additionally the FAA was not meant to reach em-
ployment contracts.47 W.H.H. Piatt, an advocate for the FAA, 
stated that the Act would not cover workers,48 and the constitu-
tional understanding at that time was that employment con-
tracts were strictly intrastate, and thus outside of Congress’s 
plenary powers.49 To ensure that employees were not covered by 
the FAA, Congress expressly excluded “seamen, railroad employ-
ees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce,”50 those being the only employees that Congress 
thought it had power to regulate at that time.51 Drafters of the 
FAA similarly did not intend for it to cover contracts of adhe-
sion.52 Piatt stated that “I would not favor any kind of legislation 
that would permit the forcing a man to sign . . . [an adhesive] 
contract [containing a mandatory arbitration clause]”53 since the 
primary use of arbitration agreements was to settle disputes be-
tween merchants.54  
 
 46. In arguing for why the FAA was needed, one of the bill’s biggest propo-
nents, Julius Cohen, stated that an agreement to arbitrate was essentially a 
business contract and should be honored just like other business contracts. The 
then-chairman of the Committee of Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of 
the American Bar Association, W.H.H. Piatt, stated that the FAA was “purely 
an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agree-
ing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.” Marga-
ret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Fed-
eral Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 104, 
106 (2006) (citing Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923)). 
 47. Id. at 105. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 136 (2001) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely 
confined) our case law indicated that the only employment relationships subject 
to the commerce power were those in which workers were actually engaged in 
interstate commerce.”). 
 50. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 51. See Moses, supra note 46, at 106. 
 52. Contracts of adhesion are offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis where 
one party is in a substantially stronger bargaining position than the other. See 
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 855–56 (1964) (discussing contracts of adhesion and com-
pulsory contracts). 
 53. See Moses, supra note 46, at 107.  
 54. Id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1636 n.18 (citing Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissent-
ing)). 
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Finally, the FAA’s language and legislative history portend 
that Congress did not intend to supersede states’ public policy 
regarding contracts nor for the FAA to apply in state courts. Sec-
tions three and four of the FAA state that the statute applies to 
“the courts of the United States” and “United States district 
court[s].”55 The legislative history also evinces an intent for the 
FAA to be a procedural rule to apply only in federal courts.56 
States would still retain their traditional authority to determine 
if an enforceable contract exists in the first place.57 Indeed, in his 
testimony, Cohen, who helped draft the FAA, emphasized that 
“[t]here is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal 
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submis-
sion to arbitration enforcement.”58 The FAA was enacted during 
the “golden age of the public policy doctrine” when courts found 
contracts unenforceable due to violations of public policy more 
than often than they invoked other defenses such as mistake, 
duress, lack of consideration, or the statute of frauds.59 As such, 
a legislator in 1925 would likely have thought that the public 
policy defense would fit within the § 2 savings clause.60 
B. THE PERVERSION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT  
While those who passed the FAA viewed it as having a lim-
ited scope,61 the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law since, 
and especially in the past few decades, has morphed the FAA 
into a law that no legislator in 1925 would recognize. Justice 
O’Connor called the Court’s FAA jurisprudence “an edifice of its 
own creation” which the Court built by “abandon[ing] all pre-
tense of ascertaining congressional intent.”62 
 
 55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4; see also Horton, supra note 38, at 1226–27 (“[H]alf of 
the FAA’s . . . sections expressly apply only to federal courts.”).  
 56. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1227 (“[T]he House Report on the FAA 
declares that ‘[w]hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is 
a question of procedure to be determined by the law [of the] court in which the 
proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law.’”); see also Moses, supra 
note 46, at 110 (explaining that the Committee members envisioned the FAA as 
a procedural statute related only to federal court). 
 57. Horton, supra note 38, at 1260. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 1223–24. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See supra Part I.A. 
 62. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring). 
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1. Initial Expansion of the Scope of the FAA 
In the decades following the enactment of the FAA, the use 
of arbitration remained largely the same and courts’ interpreta-
tions hewed rather closely to the FAA’s purpose. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, the Supreme Court’s view of the FAA 
changed dramatically.63 In 1983 the Court first announced that 
federal policy favors the arbitration of claims.64 Saying that the 
FAA was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements,”65 the Court declared that “any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration.”66 The Court would use this lan-
guage and the broad federal policy which it purports to have 
brought to light numerous times in the ensuing years to expand 
the scope of the FAA.67 
A year later in Southland Corp. v. Keating the Supreme 
Court held, for the first time, that the FAA applies in state courts 
and that it supersedes contrary state law.68 The Court explained 
that Congress made a substantive rule by enacting the FAA and 
that it applies regardless of the forum in which the claim is 
brought.69 Congress, according to the Court, “intended to fore-
close state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”70 
The next major expansion of the scope of the FAA came in 
1991 in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.71 Although the 
 
 63. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1637. 
 64. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983); see also Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1637. 
 65. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see Sternlight supra note 
15, at 1637.  
 66. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
 67. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (quoting 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in support of enforcing 
the parties’ arbitration agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 339 (2011) (same); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 
n.14 (2001) (same).  
 68. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (“[S]ince the over-
whelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes 
subject only to federal-court jurisdiction.”); see also Horton, supra note 38, at 
1227 (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984)). 
 69. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11, 15. 
 70. Id. at 16. 
 71. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 created a cause 
of action for those who were victims of age discrimination, the 
Court in Gilmer held that an agreement to arbitrate trumped the 
statutory right of action.72 The extension of the FAA to cover a 
statutory claim in an employment context was seen as a signifi-
cant expansion of the scope of the FAA.73 
2. State Preemption 
A significant portion of the judicial expansion of the FAA 
has occurred by narrowing the scope of the statute’s savings 
clause.74 The wheels of FAA preemption were set in motion in 
Southland,75 but the frequency with which the Supreme Court 
finds state laws to be preempted by the FAA has increased since. 
Perry v. Thomas represents the beginning of the Court’s ex-
pansion of the scope of FAA preemption of state laws.76 In Perry, 
a securities salesman brought suit against his former employer 
under a California statute that provided for actions to collect 
wages “without regard to the existence of any private agreement 
to arbitrate.”77 The Court held that under the Supremacy Clause 
the FAA preempts the state statute.78 Perhaps the most im-
portant aspect of Perry lies in footnote nine, which clarifies the 
scope of FAA preemption: 
An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a 
matter of federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.” Thus state law, whether of 
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern 
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of con-
tracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely 
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport 
with this requirement of § 2.79 
Thus, state laws that single out arbitration are preempted, while 
those that govern “contracts generally” are not.  
 
 72. Id. at 35. 
 73. See George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ram-
ifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 182 (1998) (explaining that the extension of the FAA to 
the employment context, rather than just commercial contracts, was “a signifi-
cant extension of previous rulings”). 
 74. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 75. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11–12. 
 76. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
 77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2015). 
 78. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491. 
 79. Id. at 492 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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The Court bolstered this preemption doctrine in Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.80 Prior to Allied-Bruce, courts 
were unsure how to apply § 2 of the FAA which states that an 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable in “a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce.”81 In Allied-Bruce, the Supreme 
Court adopted the broadest possible interpretation—that the 
FAA covers all contracts affecting commerce.82 In addition to 
“eviscerat[ing] state statutes meant to protect consumers,” the 
Court’s holding “expanded the FAA to cover transactions for 
which it was never designed.”83 
In Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, a franchisee brought 
suit against a franchisor with whom he had signed an agreement 
to arbitrate.84 The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the 
agreement was covered by the FAA, but held that the agreement 
was rendered unenforceable by a violation of a Montana state 
law requiring agreements to arbitrate to be on the first page of 
the agreement in underlined capital letters.85 In deciding 
whether the state law was preempted, the Montana Supreme 
Court considered the question of whether the state law would 
“undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”86 The Supreme 
Court clarified that this consideration was unnecessary.87 In-
stead, the Court plainly stated that “Courts may not . . . invali-
date arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions.”88 Threshold limitations, such as the no-
tice provision, the Court said, are “antithetical” to the goals and 
policies of the FAA.89 
Undeterred by the legislative history suggesting that the 
contracts of employees were intended to not be covered by the 
FAA,90 the Court held in Circuit City Stores v. Adams that the 
 
 80. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 81. See id. at 269–70 (discussing different court interpretations of § 2 of the 
FAA). 
 82. Id. at 270. 
 83. Janet M. Grossnickle, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the 
Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the 
Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. REV. 769, 769 (1995) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. 
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282–83 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 84. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 85. Id. at 684. 
 86. Id. at 685. 
 87. Id. at 688.  
 88. Id. at 687. 
 89. Id. at 688. 
 90. See supra Part I.A. 
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contracts of transportation workers are the only employment 
contracts outside the scope of the FAA.91 Circuit City clarified 
what had before been the subject of debate:92 businesses may re-
quire their employees to resolve disputes through arbitration.93 
Circuit City was heralded as a “big[] pro-business decision” that 
signaled “a very good year for big corporations.”94 
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion the Court not only bolstered 
the state preemption doctrine, but also laid the groundwork to 
preclude class-wide arbitrations.95 In Concepcion, consumers re-
ceived “free” phones from AT&T but were later charged sales 
tax.96 The agreement that consumers entered into mandated ar-
bitration and prohibited class arbitrations.97 However, when the 
plaintiff brought this claim in federal district court and AT&T 
moved to compel arbitration, the court refused to compel arbitra-
tion, relying on California’s rule98 that unconscionable agree-
ments to arbitrate would not be enforced.99 When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that this rule was 
preempted by § 2 of the FAA.100 In Concepcion, the Court ex-
tended the preemption doctrine to cover “state-law rules that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objec-
tives.”101 Even though the Discover Bank rule rested on uncon-
scionability, a doctrine that would seem to be a “ground[] [that] 
 
 91. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 92. The Court in Circuit City noted the circuit split on this question. Id. at 
110–11; see also Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 
UMKC L. REV. 693, 707–09 (1993) (noting the uncertainty regarding which em-
ployment contracts are covered by the FAA); David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer 
Where It Belongs: The FAA’s Labor Exemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
253 (2000) (discussing different interpretations of the labor exception).  
 93. Kristin McCandless, Comment, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: The 
Debate over Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context Rages On, 80 
DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 235 (2002).  
 94. Id. (citing Robert S. Greenberger, Businesses See Gains in High-Court 
Term, WALL STREET J., June 29, 2001, at B4). 
 95. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 96. The Concepcions paid only $30.22 in sales tax for the phone, making 
this case the perfect example of how many claims only make sense to bring as a 
class. Id. at 337. 
 97. See id. at 336. 
 98. This is often called the Discover Bank rule, alluding to the case in which 
this rule was announced. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 
(2005). 
 99. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338; see also Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100 . 
 100. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 101. Id. at 343.  
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exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”102 
the Supreme Court nevertheless held it to be preempted.103  
Another key holding of Concepcion is that class arbitration 
is inconsistent with the FAA,104 a holding which the Supreme 
Court’s expanded in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.105 The cases 
consolidated in Epic Systems all involved employment contracts 
with agreements to arbitrate on an individual basis.106 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had, in 2012, held that re-
quiring an employee to sign an agreement to arbitrate claims 
individually as a condition of employment violated the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).107 This holding “effectively nulli-
fied” the FAA in cases where employees wished to assert claims 
as a class against an employer.108 In Epic Systems, employees 
argued that this interpretation of the NLRA is a “ground” that 
“exists at law . . . for the revocation of their arbitration agree-
ments,” and thus fits within the savings clause.109  
The Court rejected this argument, relying again on its nar-
row interpretation of the “any contract” language of the savings 
clause.110 Rather than being based on a ground that would apply 
to all contracts, the court reasoned, employees objected to the 
agreements to arbitrate specifically because they require indi-
vidual arbitration in violation of the NLRB’s interpretation of 
the NLRA.111 Doing so interferes with one of the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration, according to the Court.112 Relying on 
Concepcion, the Court stated that “courts may not allow a con-
tract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by 
mandating class wide arbitration procedures without the par-
ties’ consent.”113 The Court refused to distinguish the case from 
Concepcion, saying that Concepcion’s “rationale and rule” apply 
 
 102. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 104. Id. at 344. 
 105. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 106. Id. at 1619–20. 
 107. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292 (2012). 
 108. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
 109. Id. at 1622. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1623. 
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to a case where a contract term is rendered illegal the same way 
it applied in Concepcion.114 
In conclusion, the scope of the FAA today would be virtually 
unrecognizable to the Congress that originally enacted it. The 
FAA has been interpreted to encompass contracts between em-
ployers and employees, contrary to what Congress intended in 
1925. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
FAA has led to a trampling of state contract and arbitration law, 
which Congress did not intend when it enacted the FAA. In a 
series of 5–4 decisions115 the Court has transformed what was 
originally understood to be a narrow procedural rule for federal 
courts into an all-encompassing beast trampling state contract 
law and tenets of basic fairness.  
C. RISE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE HARMS 
THAT EMANATE 
Mandatory arbitration clauses pervade many facets of our 
everyday life. A 2004 study found that more than a third of con-
sumer transactions made an average person living in Los Ange-
les subject to mandatory arbitration.116 One would expect that 
this number has gone up, in part due to decisions like Concep-
cion, which incentivize corporations to use mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in their contracts. Use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses by employers has increased from only two percent in 
1992 to fifty-four percent today.117 This percentage corresponds 
to 60.1 million American workers who are now barred from 
bringing a suit against their employer in court.118 Of those 60.1 
million, nearly 25 million are contractually forbidden from bring-
ing or participating in a class action lawsuit.119  
 
 114. Id.  
 115. Among other FAA cases, Epic Systems, Concepcion, and Circuit City 
were all 5–4 decisions.  
 116. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004). 
 117. The Editorial Board, The Supreme Court Sticks It to Workers, Again, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/opinion/ 
supreme-court-workers-payment.html [https://perma.cc/C4ED-WDVG]. 
 118. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 5 (2018).  
 119. Id. at 11.  
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Mandating arbitration negatively impacts an employee’s 
ability and willingness to bring a claim.120 One of the most sig-
nificant critiques of mandatory arbitration, however, is not re-
lated to individuals, but rather the public harm that occurs as a 
result of mandatory arbitration.121 The “public justice” critique 
posits that the curtailing of public trials and the retardation of 
the development of public precedent are some of the biggest 
harms that come from mandatory arbitration.122 This critique 
suggests that the private market (arbitration) cannot be counted 
on to provide the same public good that courts can.123 Aside from 
the fairness and consistency usually demonstrated by courts, 
they also serve an “educative function” of informing the public 
how laws are being interpreted.124 Private means of dispute res-
olution, like arbitration, typically do not serve these same func-
tions.125 
Another critique of arbitration is that its use runs counter 
to democratic values.126 When arbitration is mandatory and 
binding, arbitration may “erode public trust in the courts and in 
the law.”127 By taking place in non-public forums and by allowing 
parties to exclude arbitrators, arbitration fails to be participa-
tory in a democratic sense.128 Arbitration also offers little in the 
way of accountability,129 another key democratic tenet. Arbitra-
tion is also less transparent than proceedings in an open court.130 
Rather than the philosophical considerations of the inade-
quacy of arbitration system, what matters most for workers is 
the actual ability to bring a claim in an impartial forum and to 
obtain relief. Unfortunately for workers, arbitration often does 
 
 120. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Em-
ployment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990’s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1017, 1019 (1996). 
 121. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1661. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1662 (citing David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Pub-
lic Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995)). 
 124. See Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitra-
tion at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 369 (2006). 
 125. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1672. 
 126. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Prob-
lem of Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004) (examining the “rela-
tionship between arbitration and constitutional democracy”). 
 127. Id. at 295. 
 128. Id. at 299. 
 129. Id. at 300–01. 
 130. Id. at 301. 
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not provide such a forum. The drafter of a contract containing a 
mandatory arbitration clause, which is almost always the em-
ployer,131 is in a position to game the terms of the arbitration in 
their favor.132 The drafter, or the “pinstriped exploiter[],” as one 
court has referred to them,133 selects the arbitrator or the arbi-
tration provider, which can lead to bias on the part of the arbi-
trator.134 An arbitrator’s desire to appease the employer-contract 
drafter in hopes of future business may influence the arbitrator’s 
decision-making process in favor of that employer.135 The em-
ployer is significantly more likely than the employee to have 
been through multiple arbitrations before, leading to a “repeat 
player” problem where the employer knows the rules and pro-
clivities of the arbitrator far better than the employee.136 Finally, 
the drafter of the arbitration provision may tailor the provision 
to impose additional costs on the employee.137 This costliness 
problem is compounded when an employer prohibits employees 
from proceeding with their claims jointly.138 
Empirics support the assertion that requiring mandatory 
arbitration works against workers’ rights. Lower-income em-
ployees are often made to pay forum fees or attorney fees, or 
both.139 These high costs may price employees out of the arbitra-
tion market.140 Generally, damage awards are lower in arbitra-
tion than they are in a judicial forum.141 The data on this is sub-
ject to some qualification, but median awards are higher in 
 
 131. Accord Nicholas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Con-
tracts, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 172, 173 (1965). 
 132. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1650. 
 133. Lytle v. Citifinancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002). 
 134. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1650. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Specula-
tions on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974)). 
 137. Id. at 1651. This may be done by holding the arbitration in a distant 
place, increasing transaction costs, selecting an arbitrator with high fees, or 
limiting discovery to expensive means. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1651–52. 
 139. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low 
Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2003, at 12 (discussing how arbitration clauses 
can be used to impose costs on customers and employees). 
 140. See Bales, supra note 124, at 346 (“[H]igh arbitration costs can risk 
pricing employees out of the market.”). 
 141. See id. at 350 (comparing arbitration and litigation costs). 
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judicial forums than arbitral forums,142 and damages awarded 
as a percentage of damages demanded are significantly higher 
in judicial awards than arbitral awards.143 Additionally, arbitra-
tion has been shown to have disparate impacts on different 
groups. Notably, women are less likely than men to obtain a 
“win” at arbitration.144 Due to the relatively racially homogenous 
makeup of arbitration panels, some have speculated that people 
of color may be disadvantaged in an arbitral forum.145 This prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that arbitrators are selected by 
the parties rather than randomly assigned, as with judges.146 
In sum, mandatory arbitration is damaging to both individ-
ual worker’s rights and the public good writ large. Employers 
mandating individual arbitrations would be less problematic if 
employers and employees entered into employment contracts at 
arm’s length. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case.147 As 
such, requiring individuals to bring their claims on an individual 
basis is at odds with basic tenets of fairness.148 
D. THE STATE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
The state of worker rights and worker power in America has 
reached what some consider to be a “crisis level[].”149 Such a cri-
sis is due to a multitude of factors. The power of unions has been 
 
 142. Id. (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitra-
tion and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison 16–19 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 65, 2003), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract-id=389780). 
 143. See id. at 350 (citing Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Ar-
bitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 48–49 (1998) 
(“[Maltby] found that the mean litigated award was 70% of the demand, while 
the mean arbitrated award was 25% of the demand.”)).  
 144. See id. at 351–52 (discussing effects of mandatory arbitration on differ-
ent classes of employees). 
 145. See generally Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Bi-
ased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM. 
ARB. 1 (2005) (claiming that the race of the arbitrator has a significant impact 
on employment discrimination disputes). 
 146. See Bales, supra note 124, at 352 (explaining how arbitrators are se-
lected). 
 147. See infra Part II.A. 
 148. See generally Sternlight, supra note 15 (discussing why mandatory ar-
bitration is problematic). 
 149. MICHELLE MILLER & ERIC HARRIS BERNSTEIN, ROOSEVELT INST., NEW 
FRONTIERS OF WORKER POWER: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MOD-
ERN ECONOMY 2 (2017). 
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diminishing for decades150 due to legislative151 and judicial152 as-
saults on unions. Additionally, many unionized jobs have been 
shipped abroad, further weakening union power and making 
good-paying jobs that do not require a college degree scarcer.153 
Wages for some workers have been stagnant for the past few dec-
ades,154 and the rise155 of the “gig economy” means less predicta-
bility and fewer benefits for workers.156 
 
 150. See Union Members: 2019, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QSX 
-XGUS] (showing that only 10.3% of U.S. workers are union members, down 
from 20.1% in 1983, the first year the Bureau of Labor Statistics kept statistics 
on union membership). 
 151. See DAVID MADLAND & ALEX ROWELL, ATTACKS ON PUBLIC-SECTOR 
UNIONS HARM STATES 2 (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/ 
uploads/sites/2/2017/11/15074954/ImpactofWisconsinAct10-brief.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JT4D-YFEJ] (showing the ill-effects of Wisconsin’s Act 10); FRANK 
MANZO IV & ROBERT BRUNO, THE IMPACT OF “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS ON LA-
BOR MARKET OUTCOMES IN THREE MIDWEST STATES: EVIDENCE FROM INDIANA, 
MICHIGAN, AND WISCONSIN (2010–2016) (2017), https://ler.illinois.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/03/RTW-in-the-Midwest-2010-2016.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/W8ZN-T9HJ] (showing that workers in states that had adopted “right-to-
work” laws earned less and were less likely to be a member of a union). 
 152. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2449 (2018) (holding that a state cannot require non-union members 
to contribute agency fees to the union); Dana Goldstein & Erica L. Green, What 
the Supreme Court’s Janus Decision Means for Teacher Unions, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/teacher-unions-fallout 
-supreme-court-janus.html [https://perma.cc/49H7-PT37] (speculating that the 
Janus decision may harm teachers’ unions specifically). 
 153. See generally Charles R. Perry, Outsourcing and Union Power, 18 J. 
LAB. RES. 521 (1997) (explaining how outsourcing has diminished the power of 
unions). 
 154. See Drew DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely 
Budged in Decades, PEW RESEARCH: FACTTANK (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have 
-barely-budged-for-decades/ [https://perma.cc/YQ9K-HPLM] (“[T]oday’s real av-
erage wage [-] has about the same purchasing power it did 40 years ago.”); Law-
rence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 6, 
2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4SKS-YCXF] (discussing wage trends of the last three decades). 
 155. The “gig economy” is estimated to include 34% of U.S. workers and was 
projected to increase to 43% by 2020. Patrick Gillespie, Intuit: Gig Economy Is 
34% of US Workforce, CNN BUS. (May 24, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/ 
05/24/news/economy/gig-economy-intuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/2U9R 
-KSVQ].  
 156. See Adrian Chen, Next Stop, Uberland: The Onrushing Algorithmic Fu-
ture of Work, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 15, 2018), http://nymag.com/ 
intelligencer/2018/11/alex-rosenblats-uberland-review.html?utm_campaign= 
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Against this worker-unfriendly backdrop the problem of 
wage theft runs rampant. Wage theft is when an employer fails 
to pay an employee money that the employee is legally entitled 
to.157 Wage theft includes instances where an employee is not 
paid the mandated minimum wage, not paid overtime, misclas-
sified as an independent contractor, or made to work unpaid 
time before or after a shift, among other violations.158 Wage theft 
is a “transfer from low-income employees to business owners 
that worsens income inequality, hurts workers and their fami-
lies, and damages the sense of fairness and justice that a democ-
racy needs to survive.”159 The problem of wage theft dispropor-
tionately affects women and foreign-born workers,160 and those 
who report it may face retaliation in the workplace.161  
When workers wish to vindicate their rights and obtain 
their rightfully-earned pay that is due to them, the most effective 
course of action is often collective action.162 Typically, no individ-
ual is owed enough money to make it worth it for an attorney to 
take the case on an individual basis.163 To cure this problem, 
 
nym&utm_medium=s1&utm_source=tw [https://perma.cc/JG8T-5DP6] (detail-
ing the invasiveness inherent in driving for Uber as well as the poverty-wage 
level pay); see also Robert Reich, The Downside of the Gig Economy, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.newsweek.com/downside-gig-economy-365422/ 
[https://perma.cc/JHR9-HSVT] (explaining how the “gig economy” negatively af-
fects workers’ benefits). 
 157. See BRADY MEIXELL & ROSS EISENBREY, ECON. POL’Y INST., AN EPI-
DEMIC OF WAGE THEFT IS COSTING WORKERS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOL-
LARS A YEAR 1 (2014) (explaining the definition of “wage theft”); What Is Wage 
Theft?, UCLA LABOR CTR. (May 6, 2015), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wage 
-theft/ [https://perma.cc/4V9S-7LTK] (same). 
 158. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORK-
ERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2–4 
(2009) (explaining different kinds of violations of employment and labor laws). 
 159. MEIXELL & EISENBREY, supra note 157, at 1–2. 
 160. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 158, at 5 (“Women were significantly 
more likely than men to experience minimum wage violations, and foreign-born 
workers were nearly twice as likely as their U.S.-born counterparts to have a 
minimum wage violation.”). 
 161. See id. at 24–25 (finding that 43% of those who reported wage theft 
faced retaliatory action at work). 
 162. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 14TH ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2018), https://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/ 
2018_Workplace_Class_Action_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S8-8K27] 
(showing that class action settlements against employers exceeded $2.72 billion 
in 2017). 
 163. See Noah Feldman, This Is What a More Conservative Supreme Court 
Looks Like, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
  
2534 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2515 
 
bringing the claims as a class action is often a more efficient 
method of asserting employees’ claims.164 Class actions make it 
easier for employees to bring claims against their employer.165 
Instead of finding a lawyer, initiating a lawsuit, and going 
through discovery, often for someone to join a class action, all 
they need to do is opt in. Employers also fear class actions, as 
these lawsuits can result in the company being liable for hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.166  
II.  THE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES TO AN EFFECTIVE 
SOLUTION FOR THE MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
PROBLEM 
The collision of Supreme Court jurisprudence distorting the 
FAA and the rise of the use of mandatory arbitration clauses 
spells harm for vulnerable parties—a harm exacerbated by an 
already hostile environment for these parties. While this result 
is clearly unjust and unpalatable, whether an effective solution 
exists is less clear. The combination of judicial drift from bedrock 
contractual principles, the creation of a monolithic FAA through 
preemption of state contract law, and the insufficiency and un-
likelihood of meaningful action at either the federal or state level 
creates a thicket through which the emergence of solutions 
seems unlikely. This is not to say, however, that solutions are 
impossible, only that any attempt at a solution must be aware of 
 
articles/2018-05-22/this-is-what-a-more-conservative-supreme-court-looks-like 
[https://perma.cc/2VC9-ZUDG] (explaining why individuals in the cases 
brought up class actions). It is important to note that this should not be taken 
to mean that these claims are insignificant. To many employees, the sums they 
are due would be significant. However, the amount owed is often less than what 
it would cost for the attorney to spend the time necessary to obtain a judgement. 
As an example, see Dee DePass, Surly Settles $2.5 Million Class-Action Lawsuit 
over Mandatory Tip-Pooling, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www 
.startribune.com/surly-settles-2-5-million-class-action-lawsuit-over-alleged 
-mandatory-tip-pooling/478407383/ [https://perma.cc/RU7H-SUKS] (noting 
that each member of the class action would be entitled to $11,600).  
 164. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deter-
rence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUDS. 47, 48–54 (1975) (explaining 
the comparative efficiency of class actions). 
 165. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir. 
2011) (describing sworn affidavits submitted by consumer law attorneys stating 
that the consumers’ claims would not be cost-effective for them to take unless 
the claims were brought as a class action). 
 166. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 162, at 33 (listing the top two 
settlements in privately-brought plaintiff wage and hour class actions as $227 
million and $110 million). 
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the potential pitfalls past attempted solutions have fallen victim 
to. By avoiding these pitfalls, a workable, effective solution may 
come to light, as this Note proposes in Part III.  
A. DRIFT FROM BASIC CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES 
At the core of any first-year contracts course in law school 
are various bedrock contractual principles.167 These basic  
contractual principles168 serve to promote fairness,169 effi-
ciency,170 and predictability.171 Although these principles are 
generally regarded as black letter law,172 courts do not always 
strictly adhere to them. Straying from these principles causes 
harm to parties with weaker bargaining positions, especially in 
the context of the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate. 
One of the most fundamental doctrines in contract law is the 
requirement of mutual assent.173 Mutual assent to a contract 
 
 167. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Syllabus for Contract Law 2–3 (2017) (un-
published course syllabus) (on file with author) (listing mutual assent, consid-
eration, and promissory estoppel as concepts that will be taught). 
 168. These include concepts such as mutual assent through offer and ac-
ceptance, unconscionability, voiding contracts as against public policy, mistake, 
and duress. 
 169. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry 
and the “Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 
368 (1995) (stating that many strict contract law principles have been sup-
planted by a growth of more equitable doctrines); Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of 
Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War 
Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 648 (2009) (noting that contract law devel-
oped largely to preserve fundamental fairness for contracting parties). See gen-
erally Josse Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 RATIO JURIS 68 (2015) (ap-
plying John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to the field of contract law).  
 170. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Justice, Fault, and Efficiency in Contract Law, 
3 ITALIAN L.J. 37, 38 (2017) (explaining that the capitalist conception of contract 
law is that it should be facilitative and increase efficiency); e.g., Jody S. Kraus, 
Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration 
Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 420 (2001) (“Economic contract theories seek to 
explain and justify contract law by analyzing the extent to which contract doc-
trines promote efficiency.”).  
 171. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 577 (2003) (noting that businesses 
prefer a textualist approach to contract interpretation due to the certainty and 
predictability provided by that approach). 
 172. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a man-
ifestation of mutual assent to the exchange . . . .”). 
 173. See id. § 18 (“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires 
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means that the parties have had a “meeting of the minds,” mean-
ing that both parties to a contract have reached a tacit agree-
ment regarding the meaning of contract.174 The concept of mu-
tual assent through a meeting of the minds is offended, however, 
when a contract isn’t negotiated between two parties, but is ra-
ther offered on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis, so-called “contracts of 
adhesion.”175 The term “contract of adhesion,” often used pejora-
tively,176 refers to those contracts in which “a single will is exclu-
sively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its 
law . . . to the adhesion of those who would wish to accept the 
law.”177 Adhesive contracts are the “dominant means of regulat-
ing exchanges between organizations and individuals in contem-
porary life.”178 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that “the 
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than ad-
hesive are long past.”179 
Although adhesive contracts promote efficiency by reducing 
transactional costs,180 these contracts are typically neither read 
nor understood by the non-drafting party. Form contracts are 
generally long, complex, and not negotiated for by the non-draft-
ing party.181 Additionally, it is considered a “modern reality” that 
employers have the power to require a potential employee to 
 
that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.”); LIN-
TON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (one vol. ed. 1952) (describing elements 
of forming a contract). 
 174. See Mutual Assent, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (William S. Ander-
son ed., 3d ed. 1969). 
 175. The term “contract of adhesion” was coined by Edwin W. Patterson, who 
derived it from a study of the German Civil Code by a French jurist. Edwin W. 
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 
833, 856 (1964). 
 176. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
627, 627 (2002).  
 177. Patterson, supra note 175, at 856 (citing RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA 
DÉCLARATION DE VOLONTÉ § 89, at 229–30 (Raymond Saleilles trans., 1901)).  
 178. Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 
291, 299 (2012) (citing BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 
(Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007)). 
 179. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–47 (2011) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 180. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (explaining the ef-
ficiency of standard form contracts). 
 181. Cf. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 233 (2002) (explaining the characteristics of con-
sumer contracts).  
  
2020] MANDATORY ARBITRATION 2537 
 
agree to these form contracts as a precondition to employment.182 
Research has shown that many adults are incapable of compre-
hending the contents of these contracts or picking out the im-
portant provisions within the contracts.183 Further, drafting par-
ties sometimes deliberately structure their contracts to 
discourage the non-drafting party from reading or objecting to 
the terms of the contract.184 Of course the fact that the non-draft-
ing party often does not read the contract does not render the 
contract invalid, but it does severely undermine the idea that 
these contracts are bargained-for manifestations of mutual as-
sent.  
Another basic contractual principle which is often rendered 
inapplicable when it comes to arbitration clauses is unconscion-
ability. The doctrine of unconscionability reflects a recognition 
that contracts are sometimes so unfair that the only possible ex-
planation for the imbalance in terms is some sort of intrinsic 
fraud.185 The unconscionability doctrine has been called “the pri-
mary check on drafter overreaching,”186 giving it special primacy 
with regard to contracts of adhesion. The unconscionability doc-
trine varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but estab-
lishing unconscionability usually requires a showing of both pro-
cedural unconscionability (some form of oppression through 
unequal bargaining power) and substantive unconscionability 
(contract terms that produce “overly harsh” or “one-sided” re-
sults).187 It is generally easy to establish procedural unconscion-
ability for adhesive contracts that are offered on a take-it-or-
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Supp. 2d 902, 911–13 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). 
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(2012). 
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leave-it basis, since the non-drafting party lacks real choice re-
garding contractual terms, and sometimes whether or not to en-
ter into the contract in the first place.188 Sometimes being forced 
to arbitrate claims at all can be enough to establish substantive 
unconscionability.189 
Unconscionability thus appears to be a contract law princi-
ple that is almost tailor-made to address unfair arbitration 
clauses. In fact, unconscionability was used so often to strike 
down arbitration provisions that the doctrine became closely as-
sociated with arbitration.190 However, while unconscionability 
had before been considered a general contract defense that 
would fit within the § 2 savings clause of the FAA, when the doc-
trine of unconscionability became so closely associated with ar-
bitration it started to seem less like a general contractual de-
fense and more like a specialized tool to attack arbitration, thus 
removing it from the savings clause.191 The Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Concepcion thus signaled a death knell for the ability of 
courts to freely apply unconscionability to arbitration clauses.192 
Finally, the public policy defense, despite appearing to make 
sense to apply to arbitration, has been rendered inapplicable to 
agreements to arbitrate. This doctrine of refusing to enforce con-
tracts that are against public policy is, similar to unconsciona-
bility, aimed at protecting the public good and promoting fair-
ness.193 Even if a contract is properly entered into, it may be 
invalidated by a court if it is found to be contrary to public pol-
icy.194 The source of this public policy through which a contract 
may be invalidated can be statutes, regulations, prior case law 
proclaiming policy precedent, or through the court’s “reasoning 
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not convincingly or completely adumbrated.”195 While it would 
appear that the public policy defense would often be relevant 
when dealing with mandatory arbitration clauses, similar to the 
use of unconscionability, most arbitration-related uses of the 
public policy doctrine did not survive the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Concepcion.196 
The upshot of the discussion in this section is that basic con-
tractual principles have often been disregarded in the context of 
enforcing mandatory arbitration. This trend means that “con-
tract law threatens to be less of a body of true law—with rules 
and limits—and more [of] a device for the powerful drafters of 
contracts to demand and receive whatever they want.”197 The 
consent of the non-drafting party to these terms is effectively in-
voluntary, since they often have no other alternatives.198 Despite 
attempts by states to avoid knee-jerk automatic enforcement of 
arbitration provisions, such attempts have largely been fore-
closed upon by the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption jurispru-
dence.199  
Thus, taking any one of the few doctrines explained above 
and applying it to a typical employer-employee contract would 
likely render an arbitration provision contained therein invalid. 
However, as explained above, for various reasons these doctrines 
have been become inapplicable to arbitration provisions. Conse-
quently, an effective solution to mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses in employment contracts cannot rely on bare appli-
cations of these doctrines by courts.  
B. STATE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT MANDATORY ARBITRATION ARE 
OFTEN PREEMPTED BY THE FAA 
States that wish to ameliorate the harsh effects of manda-
tory arbitration face the FAA preemption problem. Although 
contract law is regarded as the prerogative of the states,200 the 
 
 195. David Adam Friedman, Bring Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 564, 565 (quoting M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal 
Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1966)). 
 196. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1238. 
 197. Belton & Bland, supra note 182, at 150.  
 198. Stephen A. Plass, Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act To Equalize 
the Adjudication Rights of Powerful and Weak Parties, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 79, 
96 (2015). 
 199. See infra Part II.B. 
 200. See Brief for Contract Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Supporting Re-
spondent, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2018) (No. 17-988). 
  
2540 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2515 
 
Supreme Court has progressively built up what some call a fed-
eral common law regarding arbitration,201 frequently displacing 
state laws governing contracts. Since mandatory pre-dispute ar-
bitration provisions in consumer and employee contracts pro-
duce unjust results, it is no surprise that various states have 
crafted laws, rules, or policies designed to eliminate, curtail, or 
soften the harsh effects of arbitration. Many states have passed 
legislation restricting the use of mandatory arbitration in cer-
tain contexts or establishing rules regarding contract formation 
in contracts with mandatory arbitration clauses.202 Additionally, 
many state courts have gone out of their way to lessen the some-
times harsh impact of mandatory arbitration.203 Unfortunately, 
many of these state-crafted rules to deal with mandatory arbi-
tration have been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the FAA’s preemptive impact.204  
Many states have passed laws intended to shield their citi-
zens from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration by limiting the use 
of arbitration provisions or trying to eliminate mandatory arbi-
tration altogether. For example, Montana enacted a statute that 
declared arbitration clauses unenforceable unless it was under-
lined and in capital letters on the first page of the contract.205 
When a franchisee brought a suit against a franchisor, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause contained 
within their contract was unenforceable since it was not under-
lined nor on the first page of the contract.206 The Supreme Court, 
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however, reversed, holding that the Montana statute was 
preempted by the FAA.207 The majority opinion noted that the 
Montana statute singles out arbitration clauses and thus does 
not fall within the § 2 savings clause since it is not a ground for 
revocation of any contract.208 Another example is Concepcion.209 
It is important to note the marked shift in these cases; even 
though the Montana statute and California’s Discover Bank rule 
are generally applicable contract defenses, they are no longer 
considered generally applicable when applied to mandatory ar-
bitration clauses. The most impactful portion of Concepcion was 
the shift from focusing on the text of the FAA savings clause to 
focusing on accomplishing the FAA’s objectives.210 No longer is 
the Court bound by the text of the FAA, but rather it is free to 
decide the scope of FAA preemption based on which result would 
best accomplish the goals of the FAA. The Court was clear that 
no longer could arbitration clauses be invalidated by legal rules 
that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from 
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”211 Nor could 
rules which covertly accomplish the same objectives by disfavor-
ing contracts that have the defining features of arbitration 
agreements.212 
One final example of the preemptive force of the FAA is 
found in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark.213 
In Kindred, plaintiffs brought suit against the nursing home 
that their family members resided at prior to passing away.214 
Their suit alleged that the nursing home provided sub-standard 
care, contributing to the death of their family members.215 At the 
time the deceased had moved into the nursing home, plaintiffs 
completed the paperwork, which included an agreement to arbi-
trate, under their powers of attorney.216 The nursing home 
moved to dismiss the case based on the arbitration provisions 
the plaintiffs signed, but the trial court ruled that the suit could 
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proceed.217 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding that 
the arbitration agreements were invalid.218 The Kentucky Su-
preme Court stated that the right of access to the courts, rooted 
in the state constitution, is “sacred” and “inviolate”219 and thus 
a power of attorney does not enable a representative to waive 
that right unless it does so explicitly.220 Since the power of attor-
ney documents in this case did not expressly allow the represent-
atives to enter into arbitration agreements, the Court held that 
the rights to a trial could not be waived absent a clear statement 
of authority to do so.221 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where a unan-
imous court reversed.222 Following the trend towards preemp-
tion, the Court held that since the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
new rule was not generally applicable, but instead targeted ar-
bitration, it was preempted by the FAA.223 The “clear-statement 
rule” announced by the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to put 
agreements to arbitrate on an equal plane as other contracts.224 
According to the Court, Kentucky did exactly what Concepcion 
forbade—adopting a legal rule that hinges on a primary charac-
teristic of arbitration.225 The Court was unpersuaded by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid preemption by framing 
the rule as one of general applicability, pointing out that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court’s proposed general applications of the 
rule, such as waiving the right to worship freely, consent to an 
arranged marriage, or bind to personal servitude, were outra-
geous.226 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the FAA 
applies only to contract enforcement, rather than contract for-
mation.227 Adopting such a view of FAA preemption would, ac-
cording to the Court, “make it trivially easy for States to under-
mine the Act—indeed, to wholly defeat it.”228 
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Critics have pointed out that the Supreme Court is often not 
clear about the scope of FAA preemption.229 Two theories 
abound: the “any-contract test” and the “total-preemption the-
ory.”230 Using the any-contract test draws from the last two 
words of the § 2 savings clause to strike down arbitration provi-
sions under rules that apply to any contract.231 The common un-
derstanding is that this includes doctrines such as fraud, duress, 
and mistake.232 However, Concepcion and other FAA preemption 
cases have been seen as a “ringing endorsement of the total-
preemption theory.”233 Under the total-preemption theory, state 
contract defenses are completely preempted and may almost 
never be used to invalidate or render unenforceable an agree-
ment to arbitrate.234 This theory is supported by the fact that 
state legislatures rarely legislate in general terms. Instead, leg-
islatures legislate to solve problems, and these problems typi-
cally afflict only slices of the population, leading to specialized 
laws. Additionally, to allow states too much control over deter-
mining contract defenses that could be used to invalidate agree-
ments to arbitrate would be to create the possibility of a “loop-
hole the size of the [FAA] itself.” 
Further evidence of the move towards total preemption lies 
in the Court’s purposivist shift regarding FAA preemption.235 
Some have argued that the Court’s FAA preemption jurispru-
dence, and especially Concepcion, move beyond mere conflict 
preemption into a new and more wide-ranging “impact preemp-
tion.”236 Impact preemption develops in a field without Congress 
expressly mandating it and is free from many of the checks that 
come into play with other types of federal preemption of state 
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laws.237 For these reasons, it is considered a “dangerous expan-
sion of federal power” and is regarded as “particularly ill suited 
to the FAA.”238 
Although total preemption seems to be the most popular 
view of the current state of FAA preemption, some disagree. 
Even though it is called an “extreme interpretation,” some be-
lieve that the fifth vote of Justice Thomas in Concepcion signaled 
that the preemption doctrine may be limited to cases that arise 
in federal courts.239 Others have argued that FAA preemption 
has “never completely eclipsed” state contract law doctrines such 
as public policy.240 
In sum, the Supreme Court has augmented FAA preemption 
to a degree where it threatens to eclipse state rules, if it has not 
already done so. Through minimizing the scope of the savings 
clause, the Court has effectively precluded state contract law 
from invalidating arbitration provisions. As controversial as this 
jurisprudence has been, it is precedential and unlikely to change 
anytime soon.241 As such, any effective state solution to the arbi-
tration-at-all-costs regime242 must find a way to thread a needle 
through this thicket. 
C. OTHER APPROACHES TO CURTAILING MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION ARE EITHER UNLIKELY OR INEFFECTIVE  
As with most problems, there are a host of possible solutions 
to remedy the problem of mandatory arbitration. Unfortunately, 
none of these are currently feasible or effective. 
1. Federal Governmental Action 
One of the easiest and most straightforward solutions would 
be action by the federal government. All three branches of the 
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federal government hold power to remedy the problem of wide-
spread mandatory arbitration;243 however, action from any of 
them appears unlikely.  
Congress could amend the FAA to create additional excep-
tions or completely repeal it.244 Additionally, Congress could cre-
ate causes of action and exempt those causes of action from ar-
bitration. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that 
Congress holds the power to render certain claims non-arbitra-
ble.245 Although some progress has been made in chipping away 
at mandatory arbitration, such as the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibi-
tion of pre-dispute arbitration in residential mortgages,246 it is 
unlikely that a general reform to the system of arbitration would 
pass in the Senate in its current composition.247 
The Supreme Court is an unlikely source of a solution, espe-
cially considering that the Court is one of the main causes of the 
problem.248 The Court could reverse course at any time249 and 
treat arbitration agreements more skeptically, but this is su-
premely unlikely to happen, especially considering the current 
composition of the Court.250 Even though earlier arbitration 
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cases garnered broader support amongst the justices, the cur-
rent Republican-appointed judges now “seem farther from the 
political center on law governing adhesive arbitration agree-
ments.”251 
Although federal legislative action and the Supreme Court 
reversing course seem unlikely, the executive branch, through 
agency action, could theoretically provide a solution to manda-
tory arbitration.252 Upon closer examination, this avenue can be 
shown to be unlikely and fickle. Remember that Epic Systems253 
concerned an agency action.254 When the case reached the Su-
preme Court, the agency’s rule was rejected, resolving the ap-
parent conflict between the FAA and the NLRB’s rule in favor of 
the FAA.255 
Yet, the NLRB is not alone in terms of agencies that have 
the power to curtail mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has express au-
thorization to create rules to restrict mandatory pre-dispute ar-
bitration.256 In July 2017, the CFPB proposed a new rule that 
would have prohibited “providers of certain consumer financial 
products and services” from using mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses and would require disclosure of arbitration rec-
ords for those entities who were covered but still allowed to con-
duct arbitration.257 Unfortunately, before the rule could become 
final, Congress passed a joint resolution disapproving of the rule 
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and President Trump signed the resolution, nullifying the pro-
posed rule.258 
A similar example of how administrative action in this 
realm is insufficient is the fluctuating level of enforcement 
through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of La-
bor. During the final days of George W. Bush’s second term, the 
Labor Department issued numerous opinion letters which pro-
vided guidance to employers about how they planned to enforce 
wage and hour laws.259 These guidance letters were considered 
to be pro-business in that they softened rules regarding pay for 
overtime as well as other wage and hour issues.260 President 
Obama rescinded these letters immediately when he took office 
in 2009.261 President Trump, in addition to cutting funding for 
the Labor Department,262 reversed course and reinstated these 
letters.263 The upshot of both this example and the CFPB exam-
ple is that while agency action to enforce wage and hour laws or 
stem mandatory arbitration can be helpful, they are often insuf-
ficient due to their fickleness and their ability to change with 
each administration. No lasting solution to this problem can be 
forged through agency action. 
2. Past State Attempts To Limit Mandatory Arbitration 
Some states have attempted to limit or prohibit the use of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. New York has prohibited 
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ing, BLOOMBERG L. (May 23, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor 
-report/trumps-20-percent-cut-in-labor-budget-aims-at-job-training [https:// 
perma.cc/58BX-ZFVY]. 
 263. See Eilperin, supra note 259. 
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mandating arbitration of workplace sexual harassment 
claims.264 This law seems to fit squarely within the group of laws 
that expressly prohibit arbitration in a certain context and is 
thus likely to be preempted by the FAA.265 California’s Assembly 
and Senate passed a bill that would have prohibited all manda-
tory arbitration in employment contracts,266 though this bill was 
vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown, who cited the fact that this bill 
would be preempted under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemp-
tion regime.267 A similar attempt was made in Vermont, when 
both chambers of the state’s legislatures passed a bill that would 
have made standard form contracts containing an arbitration 
clause presumptively unconscionable.268 This bill was vetoed by 
Governor Philip Scott, who cited the concerns of business groups 
as his reason for vetoing the bill.269 However, even if this bill had 
been signed by the Governor and was found not to be preempted 
by the FAA,270 it would have provided minimal protections to 
employees.271 
 
 264. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (CONSOL. 2018). 
 265. Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (hold-
ing California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA); see also Doctor’s 
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681–82 (1996) (invalidating a Montana state 
statute prohibiting mandating arbitration as conflicting with the FAA). 
 266. Assemb. B. 3080, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).  
 267. David G. Hagopian, Governor Vetoes AB 3080—Says Banning Employ-
ment Arbitration Agreements Violates Federal Law, CAL. LAB. & EMP’T. L. BLOG, 
https://www.callaborlaw.com/entry/governor-vetoes-ab-3080says-banning 
-employment-arbitration-agreements-violates-federal-law [https://perma.cc/ 
CMC4-745C]. Governor Gavin Newsom later signed a bill into law that ad-
dresses mandatory arbitration clauses; however, this law is probably too narrow 
to have any real effect. See Scott P. Jang & Samia M. Kirmani, New California 
Law Attacks Mandatory Arbitration Again . . . But Is It More Bark than Bite?, 
JACKSON LEWIS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/new 
-california-law-attacks-mandatory-arbitration-again-it-more-bark-bite [https:// 
perma.cc/AGK6-BV53]. 
 268. S. 105, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
 269. JOURNAL OF THE S., S. 2036–38 (Vt. 2018).  
 270. It is also likely that this statute would have been preempted, since it 
closely resembles previous attempts to use unconscionability to soften the im-
pact of mandatory arbitration. 
 271. The bill seemingly would not have even prevented arbitration. If any-
thing, it could have forced companies to provide more friendly arbitration, but 
it would not have eliminated mandatory arbitration in employment contracts. 
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3. Scholarly Proposals 
Beyond these more straightforward governmental actions, 
many scholars have proposed other ways of stemming manda-
tory pre-dispute arbitration.272 While these ideas are generally 
helpful, their effects may be more temporary or less effective 
than the solution proposed in Part III of this Note. 
For example, Sarath Sanga has argued that states should 
focus more on deterring arbitration clauses rather than enforc-
ing (or not enforcing) them.273 Sanga argues that rather than re-
lying on contract enforcement, states should deter the formation 
of such contracts in the first place.274 By focusing on deterring 
the formation of contracts that include mandatory arbitration 
clauses, Sanga argues, states can circumvent the preemption is-
sues regarding acting in contracts.275 The fatal flaw to this ap-
proach is that it fails to address the root problem and the reason 
why employers can insert mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in their contracts in the first place—the gargantuan dis-
parity in bargaining power. Would-be employees would likely 
fear retaliation or other ill-effects and may be prevented from 
reporting for these reasons. As discussed earlier,276 employment 
contracts are almost always offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Employees would presumably be forced to “leave it” to report an 
employer whose contract had an arbitration clause. This is, of 
course, assuming the employee in this situation is even aware of 
the illegality of including a mandatory arbitration clause and the 
reward offered for blowing the whistle on the employer. Addi-
tionally, some employers, especially large ones, may treat the 
fine more as a fee, and choose to simply pay the fine.277 The risk 
 
 272. E.g., Stephen A. Plass, Federal Arbitration Law and the Preservation of 
Legal Remedies, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 213 (2018); Sanga, supra note 234, at 1152. 
 273. See Sanga, supra note 234, at 1121. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Id. at 1127. 
 276. See supra Part I.A. 
 277. Cf. Darlene R. Wong, Stigma: A More Efficient Alternative to Fines in 
Deterring Corporate Misconduct, 3 CAL. J. CRIM. L. REV. 3, ¶ 2 (2000) (“‘Pay to 
pollute’ dynamics result when predictable fines allow corporations to consider 
even punitive damages as fixed costs, thereby rendering the fining system inef-
fective.”); Patricia Cohen, When Company Is Fined, Taxpayers Often Share Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/when 
-a-company-is-fined-taxpayers-often-share-the-punishment.html (explaining 
that corporate fines are often written off on the company’s taxes, shifting the 
burden to taxpayers); David Gillen, Video: A Year of Corporate Fines, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/30/business/video-a 
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of enforcement multiplied by the fine may be less than the finan-
cial benefit to the employer by staying out of court. The fine 
would have to be set at a point where it would still have a deter-
ring effect. 
Another potential solution involves ensuring that a substan-
tive remedy for employees is preserved.278 This solution rests on 
the idea that the Supreme Court’s evolution of its preference for 
arbitration occurred on the assumption that arbitration would 
serve as a “fair adjudicatory alternative.”279 Of course, consider-
ing the current widespread use of mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration provisions,280 this is no longer always the case. One way 
to reconcile this is to restructure the “effective vindication” 
rule.281 The effective vindication principle helped the Court move 
towards its current arbitration-friendly position by noting that 
as long as claims can be vindicated in an arbitral forum, no sub-
stantive claims are lost.282 The Court, as we know, later re-
treated from the effective vindication rule,283 but if the Court 
were to return to it, many arbitration provisions of the type that 
are discussed in this Note would become invalid.284 While this 
would be a satisfying and just result, it is extremely unlikely.285 
Others have proposed solutions to the effects of employees 
signing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, such as 
the inability to pursue wage theft claims.286 For instance, 
Nantiya Ruan has argued for increased enforcement of wage and 
hour claims, the establishment of a wage and hour claims court, 
and increased education about wage and hour claims for employ-
ees.287 Although increased enforcement is currently unlikely and 
 
-year-of-corporate-fines.html (noting that many companies view fines as a cost 
of doing business). 
 278. See Plass, supra note 272, at 273. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra Part I.C. 
 281. See Plass, supra note 272, at 274–76. 
 282. See id. at 264 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
 283. Id. at 263. 
 284. Id. at 275. 
 285. See supra Part II.C. 
 286. E.g., Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitra-
tion Mandates that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1103, 1139–44 (2012). 
 287. See id. 
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generally a fickle solution,288 Ruan’s other solutions are quite in-
teresting. She proposes “changing the forum to fit the need,”289 
which includes making arbitration friendlier to low-wage work-
ers and establishing a wage claims court.290 In Ruan’s proposals 
for making arbitration friendlier to low-wage workers, she sug-
gests making the terms of arbitration more generous to employ-
ees (ironically, she notes, similar to the terms in Concepcion) and 
allowing non-lawyer advocates in arbitration through the relax-
ation of regulations related to the unauthorized practice of 
law.291 In addition, Ruan argues that the establishment of wage 
claims courts, which would be modeled after small claims courts, 
would help resolve wage claims “quickly and efficiently.”292 This 
approach could be pursued on the state or federal level.293 While 
this solution seems unlikely, Ruan argues that it could materi-
alize “if spearheaded by a collaboration of worker organizations, 
unions, practitioners, and scholars.”294 
Others have suggested that establishing a third-party liabil-
ity regime for wage and hour violations would remedy the prob-
lem of wage theft.295 While this solution may help remedy the 
problem of wage theft, it does not address the fact that even if 
third-party liability was imposed on a company, the claims 
would still need to be arbitrated if the employer and employee 
had agreed to arbitrate. 
In sum, an impactful and lasting solution to the problem of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses is necessary to pro-
tect low-wage workers from wage theft and other employment-
related harms. Such a solution is proposed in the following sec-
tion. 
III.  A STATE-BASED SOLUTION TO THE MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION PROBLEM THAT AVOIDS FAA 
PREEMPTION 
Any attempt at dealing a blow to mandatory pre-dispute ar-
bitration clauses through state legislative and judicial action 
 
 288. See supra Part II.C.  
 289. See Ruan, supra note 286, at 1141. 
 290. See id. at 1141–46. 
 291. Id. at 1142–43. 
 292. Id. at 1144. 
 293. Id. at 1145. 
 294. Id. at 1146. 
 295. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010). 
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must be aware of the various pitfalls and traps inherent in such 
a fix.296 While some believe that the current FAA preemption re-
gime leaves no avenues through which states may curtail or ban 
arbitration provisions,297 there is simply too much at stake to not 
exhaust every possible remedy to this problem. Even if the solu-
tion posed below has a slight chance of success, the scope of those 
who would benefit and the degree to which the solution would 
make it easier for them to have their claims vindicated mandates 
that every possible avenue that may eliminate mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration be pursued. 
State law has long provided the rules of interpretation to 
understand contracts.298 Although the Court has strayed away 
from this doctrine in its FAA preemption jurisprudence,299 the 
principle remains. Considering the unlikelihood of action at the 
federal level,300 state action is the best bet for an impactful solu-
tion. However, as we have seen time and time again, the Court’s 
FAA preemption regime leaves little wiggle room to weave a 
state solution.301 
As such, states should enact statutes that define a set of con-
tractual terms and mandate that these terms be highlighted or 
otherwise brought to the attention of the accepting party. State 
courts should then interpret these statutes in a way where they 
apply not only to arbitration (the chief target of the statutes), but 
also to other provisions, as to avoid FAA preemption. Enacting 
these statutes and interpreting them in this way will foster 
awareness of the contents of the adhesive contracts and will en-
sure that true mutual assent exists between the parties. 
 
 296. See supra Part II. 
 297. See Sanga, supra note 234, at 1143. 
 298. See Brief for Contract Law Scholars as Amici Curiae, supra note 200. 
 299. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 
1426 (2017) (finding that courts may not invalidate an arbitration agreement 
on legal rules that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from 
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue” (citing AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011))); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 687 (1996) (discussing how courts may not invalidate arbitration agree-
ments under state laws which are applicable only to arbitration provisions).  
 300. See supra Part II.C. 
 301. See Plass, supra note 278, at 237 (“The new federal rules of preemption 
have nullified state laws that enforce arbitration contracts but provide contract 
defenses designed to limit oppression and unfair surprise embedded at the for-
mation stage.”). 
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A. LESSONS FROM STATES’ PAST FAILED ATTEMPTS  
Any state solution must navigate the potential preemption 
problem. The solution must not “derive [its] meaning from the 
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”302 An informative 
example of a state trying to do this, but failing, is provided in 
Kindred.303 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court nominally 
attempted to base its holding on a generally applicable contract 
rule, the Supreme Court considered this “clear statement rule” a 
pretext used to disfavor arbitration.304 The fatal flaw in the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court’s effort to avoid the long reach of the Su-
preme Court’s FAA preemption regime was, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, “adopt[ing] a legal rule hinging on the primary 
characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of 
the right to go to court and receive a jury trial.”305 The Court did 
not believe the Kentucky Supreme Court’s explanation that this 
was in fact a general contractual principle since this clear state-
ment rule would also apply to other “fundamental constitutional 
rights,” such as the right to worship freely, consent to an ar-
ranged marriage, or bind the principal to servitude, among oth-
ers.306 Far from being convinced that this passes muster to avoid 
preemption, the Supreme Court called these examples a “slim 
set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful con-
tracts”307 and analogized them to a black swan.308 Notably, how-
ever, the Court goes out of its way to reiterate that it leaves the 
door open for state courts to announce new, generally applicable 
rules in an arbitration case, so long as those rules truly apply 
generally, rather than singling out the unique aspects of arbitra-
tion.309 
A couple lessons can be learned from Kindred in developing 
a workable solution to mandatory arbitration in employment 
contracts. First, a lot can be learned from the mistakes made by 
the Kentucky Supreme Court. These mistakes include announc-
ing the rule for the first time in this case, especially applying the 
 
 302. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 303. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1421; supra Part I.B. 
 304. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1426–27. 
 305. Id. at 1427. 
 306. Id. at 1426 (citing Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 
306, 328 (Ky. 2015)). 
 307. Id. at 1427. 
 308. Id. at 1428. 
 309. Id. at 1428 n.2. 
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rule to arbitration before applying it to other “fundamental con-
stitutional rights” that it claimed the rule would also apply to.310 
Second, one could argue that the clear statement rule was either 
too narrow or too broad. It was too narrow in the sense that there 
are few other fundamental constitutional rights which one would 
normally waive in a contract. This led to the far-fetched and 
strange examples given by the Kentucky Supreme Court.311 On 
the other hand, the clear statement rule, if applied consistently, 
would include many clauses in “routine contracts” that are “exe-
cuted day in and day out.”312 This overbreadth allowed the Su-
preme Court to pierce the Kentucky Supreme Court’s pretextual 
veil by pointing out that if this new rule were strictly followed, 
it would sweep too broadly to be practicable.313  
Other state attempts have been even cruder than the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court’s in Kindred. For instance, in Marmet 
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Supreme Court summar-
ily reversed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals deci-
sion that held arbitration of personal injury or wrongful death 
claims violate public policy.314 This was a straightforward case 
for the Court to decide considering the rule that when state law 
prohibits the arbitration of certain claims, that state law is dis-
placed by the FAA.315 The lesson from Marmet is simple: the 
state law must not outrightly prohibit arbitration of any certain 
type of claim.316 
Another source to draw from when considering how to craft 
a state law solution is the well-intentioned but ill-fated attempt 
made by the Vermont Legislature in 2018.317 Drafters initially 
stated that their aim was “to prohibit forced arbitration of con-
sumer disputes.”318 While it is not clear whether a court would 
 
 310. Id. at 1427. 
 311. Id. at 1426. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 1427. 
 314. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 534 (2012) 
(per curiam). 
 315. Id. at 533. 
 316. Therefore, an outright prohibition of mandatory arbitration in employ-
ment contracts is not a workable solution. 
 317. S. 105, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
 318. See Alison Frankel, How Can States Block Mandatory Arbitration 
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take legislative history like this into account when determining 
whether the statute is preempted by the FAA, it is hard to imag-
ine even the most textualist members of the Supreme Court not 
using this as ammunition to strike down the statute, even if the 
text were sufficiently generally applicable.  
The other lesson that the Vermont attempt teaches is that 
the state statute must actually be effective. The Vermont bill 
does many things, including prohibiting resolution of a claim 
that takes place in an inconvenient venue,319 prohibiting waiver 
of rights to assert statutory claims,320 prohibiting waiver of one’s 
right to seek punitive damages, and prohibiting arbitration be-
ing more costly to the individual than seeking a judicial remedy 
would have been.321 However, even if contract drafters obeyed 
these provisions, the best case scenario is that consumers would 
face a friendlier version of arbitration, which is, after all, still 
arbitration. Doing away with some of the worst and most unjust 
aspects of arbitration does nothing to resolve the fact that even 
a friendlier version of arbitration is still immensely harmful to 
employees seeking redress for a grievance.322  
With these lessons in mind, we can begin to sketch out what 
a workable and effective solution might look like. The best bet, 
considering states’ past failed attempts at using the doctrines of 
unconscionability and public policy, is to focus on other aspects 
of contract formation and to ensure that the new rule is broad 
enough to apply not only to arbitration, but also to other contrac-
tual terms. 
B. WHAT STATES SHOULD DO (LEGISLATIVELY AND JUDICIALLY) 
As discussed above, the non-drafting party is often unaware 
of the contractual terms in an adhesive contract.323 Although 
there is typically a duty to read a contract and know its contents, 
expecting a contract adherent to do this is not always realistic, 
and this duty must be squared with another core contract law 
principle—the requirement of mutual assent.324 Adhesive con-
tracts often offend the notion of bargained-for-exchange that is 
often assumed to exist in all contracts. Courts sometimes rely on 
 
 319. S. 105 § 6055(a)(1), 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
 320. Id. § 6055(a)(2). 
 321. Id. § 6055(a)(5). 
 322. See supra Part I.C. 
 323. See supra Part II.A. 
 324. See supra Part I.A. 
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basic contractual principles when posed with a new contract law 
issue.325 Courts should use the same approach to deal with the 
numerous issues posed by adhesive contracts. Using this ap-
proach is one way to curtail the use and abuse of mandatory ar-
bitration. To effect this reinvigoration and return to basic com-
mon law contract principles, state legislatures should mandate 
this return. In order to craft an effective statute, we must deter-
mine both (1) which terms will be covered by the statute and 
(2) how the statute will treat these terms. 
1. Identifying Which Contractual Provisions Would Be 
Covered by the Rule 
The first step is considering which contractual terms would 
be covered by such a statute. To have the statute reach every 
term in every contract would almost certainly be unwieldy, inef-
ficient, and unnecessary. Instead, state legislatures should focus 
on a narrower set of terms. Additionally, it is important to keep 
in mind that enumerating the exact contractual terms that 
would be covered (arbitration clauses, for example) would likely 
lead to the statute being preempted by the FAA.326 One way to 
strike this balance is to take a results-oriented approach and fo-
cus on effects of certain clauses. For instance, the statute could 
be written in a way where it would cover all contractual terms 
that have the effect of curtailing the rights of the non-drafting 
party. Worded this way, the statute would cover arbitration 
clauses and other clauses that limit the rights of the adhering 
party without being overly broad. The statute would then cover 
choice of law provisions (curtailing the party’s right to be gov-
erned by the law where the contract was signed), restrictions of 
liability (curtailing the party’s rights to redress), unreasonable 
liquidated damages provisions (curtailing the party’s right to be 
free from unreasonable damages and the right to efficient 
breach), non-compete agreements (curtailing the right to work 
elsewhere) and, most importantly for the purpose of this Note, 
 
 325. See, e.g., Berkson v. Gogo, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 402–06 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(applying basic common law contractual principles to deal with issues posed by 
e-contracting). 
 326. The application of the statute to arbitration would almost certainly be 
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mandatory arbitration provisions (curtailing the right to seek re-
dress in a judicial forum, or, in some cases, to seek redress at 
all).327 
Another approach would be to use other jurisdictions’ unfair 
contract terms rules to inform which terms will be covered by 
this statute. The United Kingdom’s Consumer Rights Act regu-
lates terms in consumer contracts and renders “unfair terms” not 
binding on the consumer.328 The Act defines an unfair term as 
one which “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the con-
sumer.”329 Mandatory arbitration of claims is included in the 
schedule of terms that may be regarded as unfair.330 Previous 
iterations of this rule limited “unfair terms” to those which were 
not negotiated;331 however, this requirement was abrogated in 
the 2015 version.332 The European Union has a similar rule that 
defines an unfair term as one that was not individually negoti-
ated and “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
the consumer.”333 Similar to the UK rule, the EU rule only 
reaches consumer contracts.334 Other examples abound of coun-
tries having similar rules governing unfair contractual terms in 
adhesive contracts.335 The statute proposed here could use the 
same criteria for determining which terms are covered, but 
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 329. Id. § 62(4). 
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should, for obvious reasons,336 avoid enumerating arbitration-
specific terms.  
One final approach to determining which terms will be cov-
ered by this statute would be to distinguish between “visible” 
and “invisible” terms in an adhesive contract.337 Visible terms 
are those which bargained for and those which a “customary 
shopper”338 would be expected to have shopped around for.339 
The price term is considered the paradigmatic example of a vis-
ible term.340 Invisible terms are all the rest of the terms. Consid-
ering what we know about mandatory arbitration provisions,341 
they would almost certainly be considered an invisible term in 
an adhesive employment contract. The proposed statute could 
apply to invisible terms in adhesive contracts. 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to decide which of these 
approaches would be best for a state to use. Instead, deciding 
which terms will be covered by such a statute should be a policy 
decision that is left up to the states. As long as the statute is 
broad enough to cover arbitration provisions and does not single 
out arbitration, any one of these approaches would be adequate 
to address the problem. However, merely determining what 
terms will be covered by the statute is inadequate. The next sub-
part explores the question of how these terms should be treated 
to ensure true mutual assent between the adhering party and 
the drafting party. 
2. What Should Be Done with These Provisions? 
Now that we have defined what terms could be covered by 
this statute, the next thing to determine is how the statute will 
treat these terms. Given the fact that completely eliminating 
these terms would not be practicable,342 the solution must be 
something short of an outright prohibition on these terms. One 
 
 336. See supra Part II.B. 
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 338. A customary shopper can be thought of as a reasonable person seeking 
to enter into a contract, usually an adhesive one. Id. at 1252–53. 
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 341. See supra Part II.A. 
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possibility is that these terms are singled out and must require 
some additional showing of assent on the part of the non-drafting 
party. This solution would address the problem that these invis-
ible terms are rarely assented to by the non-drafting party.  
Such a solution calls to mind the Montana Legislature’s at-
tempt that was held to be preempted by the FAA in Casarotto.343 
Specifically, the statute required that any contract subject to ar-
bitration must provide notice of that fact on the first page of the 
contract in underlined capital letters.344 It is probably safe to 
guess that the Montana legislature was seeking to foster aware-
ness of arbitration clauses by enacting this statute, much the 
same as the solution proposed here is seeking to do. The critical 
difference, however, is that the Montana statute singled out ar-
bitration specifically in the statute, whereas the solution pro-
posed herein is of general applicability and is therefore consid-
erably more likely to survive FAA preemption. 
As this solution hinges on ensuring the non-drafting party 
truly assents to the adhesive contract, it would be helpful to step 
back to define what assent would mean in this context. First, for 
the non-drafting party to truly assent to the term, that party 
must know that the term is in the contract. It is unlikely that 
the non-drafting party has read the contract, and even if they 
have, they are unlikely to have understood it.345 That shows that 
while knowledge of the presence of a term in a contract is a nec-
essary element of true assent, it is not sufficient. The non-draft-
ing party must also be able to understand the term. Finally, even 
if the non-drafting party knows of the presence of the term and 
nominally understands it, they may not fully understand the im-
plications of the term, such as the procedural differences be-
tween arbitration and bringing a claim in court and how arbitra-
tion procedures may lend an advantage to the contract drafter.346 
Assent, therefore, also requires at least a basic understanding of 
the implications of the terms in the contract. 
With those points in mind, this statute should identify a 
mechanism that leads to the non-drafting party truly assenting 
by making sure the party knows of the presence of the term, un-
derstands what it means, and understands the implications of 
 
 343. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
 344. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995), invalidated by Casarotto, 517 
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181, at 242. 
 346. See supra Part I.C. 
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the term being present. This could be accomplished in a variety 
of ways, including highlighting the terms in the contract, insti-
tuting mandatory readability requirements, requiring the terms 
to be explained orally at the time of executing the contract, or 
mandating inclusion of explanatory blurbs within the contract. 
Some combination of these mechanisms would move the needle 
in terms of awareness of the non-drafting party and bring adhe-
sive contracts closer to being in line with foundational contrac-
tual principles. If these requirements are not followed, the terms 
should be declared unenforceable.  
3. Need for Legislative and Judicial Cooperation 
Finally, it should be noted that state courts will be instru-
mental in instituting this new rule. It is critical, in order to avoid 
FAA preemption, to ensure that the statute is applied generally 
and evenly, rather than singling out arbitration. Being able to 
point to cases where this statute was used in relation to contrac-
tual terms that do not involve arbitration would be immensely 
helpful in proving to the Supreme Court, were this statute to be 
challenged, that it is truly of general applicability and that it 
does not draw its meaning from the fact that arbitration is at 
issue.  
For an example of an approach to avoid, state courts can look 
to what the Kentucky Supreme Court did in Kindred.347 Specifi-
cally, the Kentucky Supreme Court announced a rule that the 
Supreme Court rather easily snuffed out as targeting arbitra-
tion.348 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court claimed the rule 
would apply to other contractual terms, these examples were 
fanciful and far-fetched.349 State courts in states that would en-
act a statute similar to what is proposed herein should work dil-
igently to ensure they are applying that statute not only to arbi-
tration clauses, but also to other clauses that would be covered. 
Doing this would be immensely helpful in withstanding FAA 
preemption. 
 
 347. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). 
 348. Id. at 1426–27. 
 349. The Supreme Court accused the Kentucky Supreme Court of “hypothe-
siz[ing] a slim set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful contracts” 
such as those where a representative waives her principal’s right to worship 
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C. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The solution proposed in this Note will of course be subject 
to some degree of skepticism. The most important criticism to 
address is that this solution just won’t work. This argument is 
likely to come from those who believe that there is no daylight in 
the Supreme Court’s preemption regime through which to weave 
a solution, sometimes called the total preemption theory.350 
Those who subscribe to this view of FAA preemption would say 
that if a state enacted a law like the one in Part III and it was 
interpreted by a state court as applicable to arbitration clauses, 
the Supreme Court would hold that the statute and interpreta-
tion would be preempted by the FAA, similar to what the Court 
has done in many previous cases. Even though the statute would 
be facially generally applicable and would have to be interpreted 
as applying to contractual terms other than arbitration clauses, 
if challenged, the Supreme Court may, consistent with its pur-
posivist move in Concepcion,351 hold that applying the rule to ar-
bitration clauses frustrates the purposes of the FAA and is thus 
preempted as it applies to arbitration clauses.  
To say that this view does not pose a very serious threat to 
undermining the purpose of this solution would be disingenuous. 
As has been proven time and time again, the Supreme Court has 
a very strong preference for arbitration and will go to great 
lengths to strike down rules which impede that preference. Even 
though preemption is a serious threat, the solution proposed in 
this Note traces some of the approaches used in previous at-
tempts to curtail the use of mandatory arbitration clauses while 
ironing out the kinks that ultimately made ruling these attempts 
to be preempted relatively easy calls post-Concepcion.352 If there 
is any room for a non-preempted solution to the use of mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, the solution proposed here is it. 
Additionally, it is still unclear whether this is the correct 
view of the scope of FAA preemption. It may be likely, but it has 
yet to receive a full-throated, clear endorsement by the Supreme 
Court. Considering the huge financial, social, and psychological 
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costs of the effects of mandatory arbitration in employment con-
tracts, even if this solution has a marginal chance at being suc-
cessful, it is worth it for states to pursue.  
Another argument against this approach is that it would be 
politically infeasible. Some state legislatures may be unlikely to 
enact legislation that would curtail the use of arbitration.353 
However, efforts in states like Vermont, New York, and Califor-
nia have shown that state legislatures have the political will to 
pass bills aiming to curtail the use of mandatory arbitration in 
adhesive contracts.354 It is true that the states’ governors vetoed 
two of these attempts—one citing concern over preemption and 
the other citing business concerns. This solution would remedy 
the former concern, but not the latter. However, governors that 
prefer to cater to business interests over protecting its most vul-
nerable citizens were never likely to endorse a solution like this 
in the first place.  
It is also possible that the solution proposed herein would be 
seen as a rather transparent attempt to limit mandatory arbi-
tration. This may be true, but, as discussed above, this proposal 
is truly more far reaching. Although mandatory arbitration 
clauses harm consumers and employees, they are far from the 
only provisions that have this effect. Thus, the fact that this so-
lution applies to those other terms means that it both offers more 
protection to those parties and renders the solution less likely to 
be preempted. 
A final critique of this solution is that it may be accompanied 
by substantial, and perhaps prohibitive, compliance costs. Espe-
cially if one of the broader classifications of contractual terms 
suggested in Part III.B were adopted by a state, a large number 
of terms in an adhesive contract would be swept up within it. 
This would likely produce substantial compliance costs on busi-
nesses who use contracts of adhesion. Even if this is the case, the 
fundamental purpose of the rule proposed above is to protect con-
sumers, not to protect the bottom line of businesses that are gov-
erned by them. Businesses have long gotten away with contract-
ing with relatively few restrictions and have doubtless profited 
greatly from this freedom. Making contracts more equitable and 
fairer should be primary to protecting the freedom to contract of 
businesses. One realm in which this critique deserves a more 
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thorough consideration is as it applies to small businesses, some 
of which may be greatly impacted by a rule like the ones pro-
posed above. However, such a detailed analysis is outside of the 
scope of this Note.  
CONCLUSION 
More and more employers are using mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Doing so gives em-
ployers benefits, such as privacy, the ability to select the arbitra-
tors, and repeat players benefits, but they often leave employees 
without meaningful recourse when they are wronged, especially 
when class waivers are used. This effect on employees is unjust 
and unpalatable in a society dedicated to the rule of law. How-
ever, there is a dearth of workable, effective solutions to this 
growing problem. Action at the federal level is unlikely and 
many attempts by states to soften the ill-effects of arbitration 
have been held to be preempted by the FAA. The challenge then, 
which this Note attempts to find a solution to, is to craft a new 
rule that would mitigate the ill-effects of arbitration while avoid-
ing FAA preemption.  
To that end, this Note provides a path for state legislatures 
and state courts to effect such a rule. The key to avoiding FAA 
preemption is to craft a rule that is of general applicability, but 
that will still combat the use of mandatory arbitration clauses. 
The way this Note proposes to achieve that is to institute rules 
that address the fact that many of these adhesive contracts of-
fend basic contractual principles such as the requirement of mu-
tual assent. States can enact laws that require terms that typi-
cally aren’t assented to by the non-drafting party, so called 
“invisible terms,” to be highlighted or brought to the attention of 
the non-drafting party at the time of contracting. Furthermore, 
true assent requires the non-drafting party to not only know the 
clause is in the contract, but also to understand the term and the 
implications that flow from it. If states enact rules that achieve 
true assent, the use of arbitration clauses, or at the very least 
the most odious uses of them, are likely to decrease. This would 
be a desirable outcome that helps protect the most vulnerable in 
our society and would reaffirm this country’s commitment to pre-
serving the right to vindicate one’s claims. 
 
